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Abstract. We consider polymatrix coordination games with individual
preferences where every player corresponds to a node in a graph who
plays with each neighbor a separate bimatrix game with non-negative
symmetric payoffs. In this paper, we study α-approximate k-equilibria
of these games, i.e., outcomes where no group of at most k players can
deviate such that each member increases his payoff by at least a factor
α. We prove that for α ≥ 2 these games have the finite coalitional im-
provement property (and thus α-approximate k-equilibria exist), while
for α < 2 this property does not hold. Further, we derive an almost
tight bound of 2α(n− 1)/(k − 1) on the price of anarchy, where n is the
number of players; in particular, it scales from unbounded for pure Nash
equilibria (k = 1) to 2α for strong equilibria (k = n). We also settle the
complexity of several problems related to the verification and existence
of these equilibria. Finally, we investigate natural means to reduce the
inefficiency of Nash equilibria. Most promisingly, we show that by fixing
the strategies of k players the price of anarchy can be reduced to n/k
(and this bound is tight).
1 Introduction
In this paper, we are interested in strategic games where the players are as-
sociated with the nodes of a graph and can benefit from coordinating their
choices with their neighbors. More specifically, we consider polymatrix coordi-
nation games with individual preferences : We are given an undirected graph
G = (N,E) on the set of players (nodes) N := {1, . . . , n}. Every player i ∈ N
has a finite set of strategies Si to choose from and an individual preference func-
tion qi : Si → R+. Each player i ∈ N plays a separate bimatrix game with
each of his neighbors in Ni := {j ∈ N | {i, j} ∈ E}. In particular, every edge
{i, j} ∈ E is associated with a payoff function qij : Si × Sj → R+, specifying a
non-negative payoff qij(si, sj) that both i and j receive if they choose strategies
si and sj , respectively. Given a joint strategy s = (s1, . . . , sn) of all players, the
overall payoff of player i is defined as
pi(s) := q
i(si) +
∑
j∈Ni
qij(si, sj). (1)
These games naturally model situations in which each player has individual
preferences over the available options (possibly not having access to all options)
and may benefit in varying degrees from coordinating with his neighbors. For
example, one might think of students deciding which language to learn, co-
workers choosing which project to work on, or friends determining which mobile
phone provider to use. On the other hand, these games also capture situations
where players prefer to anti-coordinate, e.g., competing firms profiting equally
by choosing different markets.
A special case of our games are polymatrix coordination games (without indi-
vidual preferences, i.e., qi = 0 for all i) which have previously been investigated
by Cai and Daskalakis [9]. Among other results, the authors show that pure
Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist, but that finding one is PLS-complete.
Polymatrix coordination games capture several other well-studied games among
which are party affiliation games [6], cut games [11] and congestion games with
positive externalities [12].
Yet another special case which will be of interest in this paper are graph
coordination games. Here every edge {i, j} ∈ E is associated with a non-negative
edge weight wij and the payoff function q
ij is simply defined as qij(si, sj) = wij
if si = sj and q
ij(si, sj) = 0 otherwise. Intuitively, in this game every player
(node) i ∈ N chooses a color si from the set of colors Si available to him and
receives a payoff equal to the total weight of all incident edges to neighbors
choosing the same color. These games have recently been studied by Apt et al.
[2] for the special case of unit edge weights.
This paper is devoted to the study of equilibria in polymatrix coordination
games with individual preferences. It is not hard to see that these games always
admit pure Nash equilibria. However, in general these equilibria are highly ineffi-
cient. One of the most prominent notions to assess the inefficiency of equilibria is
the price of anarchy [13]. It is defined as the ratio in social welfare of an optimal
outcome and a worst-case equilibrium. Here the social welfare of a joint strategy
s refers to the sum of the payoffs of all players, i.e., SW(s) =
∑
i∈N pi(s).
The high inefficiency of our games even arises in the special case of graph co-
ordination games as has recently been shown in [2]. To see this, fix an arbitrary
graph G = (N,E) with unit edge weights and suppose each player i ∈ N can
choose between a private color ci (only available to him) and a common color c.
Then each player i choosing his private color ci constitutes a Nash equilibrium
in which every player has a payoff of zero. In contrast, if every player chooses
the common color c then each player i obtains his maximum payoff equal to the
degree of i. As a consequence, the price of anarchy is unbounded. The example
demonstrates that the players might be unable to coordinate on the (obviously
better) common choice because they cannot escape from a bad initial configura-
tion by unilateral deviations. In particular, observe that the example breaks if
two (or more) players can deviate simultaneously. This suggests that one should
consider more refined equilibrium notions where deviations of groups of players
are allowed.
In our studies, we focus on a general equilibrium notion which allows us to
differentiate between both varying sizes of coalitional deviations and different
degrees of player reluctance to deviate. More specifically, in this paper we con-
Problem Complexity
Verification (α, k)-equilibrium (k constant) P
(α, k)-equilibrium (α fixed) co-NP-complete
α-approximate strong equilibrium P
Existence k-equilibrium (k ≥ 2 fixed) NP-complete
strong equilibrium NP-complete†
Table 1. Complexity of graph coordination games. The parameters α and k are as-
sumed to be part of the input unless they are stated to be fixed. † Shown to be efficiently
computable for forests.
sider α-approximate k-equilibria as the solution concept, i.e., outcomes that are
resilient to deviations of at most k players such that each member increases his
payoff by at least a factor of α ≥ 1. Subsequently, we call these equilibria also
(α, k)-equilibria for short. In light of this refined equilibrium notion, several nat-
ural questions arise and will be answered in this paper: Which are the precise
values of α and k that guarantee the existence of (α, k)-equilibria? What is the
price of anarchy of these equilibria as a function of α and k? How about the
complexity of problems related to the verification and existence of such equilib-
ria? And finally, are there efficient coordination mechanisms to reduce the price
of anarchy?
Our contributions. We study (α, k)-equilibria of graph and polymatrix coordi-
nation games. Our main contributions are summarized below.
1. Existence: We prove that for α ≥ 2 polymatrix coordination games have
the finite (α, k)-improvement property, i.e., every sequence of α-improving
k-deviations is finite (and thus results in an (α, k)-equilibrium). We also
exhibit an example showing that for α < 2 this property does not hold in
general. For graph coordination games we show that if the underlying graph
is a tree then (α, k)-equilibria exist for every α and k. On the other hand, if
the graph is a pseudotree (i.e., a tree with exactly one cycle) the existence
of (α, k)-equilibria cannot be guaranteed for every α < ϕ and k ≥ 2, where
ϕ = 1
2
(1 +
√
5) is the golden ratio.
2. Inefficiency: We show that the price of anarchy of (α, k)-equilibria for poly-
matrix coordination games is at most 2α(n− 1)/(k − 1). We also provide a
lower bound of 2α(n−1)/(k−1)+1−2α. In particular, the price of anarchy
drops from unbounded for pure Nash equilibria (k = 1) to 2α for strong
equilibria (k = n), both of which are tight bounds.
3. Complexity: We settle the complexity of several problems related to the
verification and existence of (α, k)-equilibria in graph coordination games.
Naturally all hardness results extend to the more general class of polymatrix
coordination games with individual preferences. A summary of our results is
given in Table 1.
4. Coordination mechanisms: We investigate two natural mechanisms that a
central coordinator might deploy to reduce the price of anarchy of pure
Nash equilibria: (i) asymmetric sharing of the common payoffs qij and (ii)
strategy imposition of a limited number of players. Concerning (i), we show
that there is no payoff distribution rule that reduces the price of anarchy in
general. As to (ii), we prove that by (temporarily) fixing the strategies of k
players according to an arbitrarily given joint strategy s, the resulting Nash
equilibrium recovers at least a fraction of k/n of the social welfare SW(s) and
this is best possible. Exploiting this in combination with a 2-approximation
algorithm for the optimal social welfare problem [12], we derive an efficient
algorithm to reduce the price of anarchy to at most 2n/k for a special class
of polymatrix coordination games with individual preferences.
Related work. Apt et al. [2] study k-equilibria in graph coordination games with
unit edge weights, which constitute a special case of our games. They identify
several graph structural properties that ensure the existence of such equilibria.
Interestingly, most of these results do not carry over to our weighted graph
coordination games, therefore demanding for the new approach of considering
approximate equilibria.
Many of the mentioned games have been studied from a computational com-
plexity point of view. In particular, Cai and Daskalakis [9] show that the problem
of finding a pure Nash equilibrium in a polymatrix coordination game is PLS-
complete. Further, they show that finding a mixed Nash equilibrium is in PPAD
∩ PLS. While this suggests that the latter problem is unlikely to be hard, it is
not known whether it is in P. It is easy to see that these results also carry over
to our polymatrix coordination games with individual preferences.3
For the special case of party affiliation games efficient algorithms to compute
an approximate Nash equilibrium are known [7, 10]. The current best approxi-
mation guarantee is 3 + ε, where ε > 0, due to Caragiannis, Fanelli and Gavin
[10]. The algorithm crucially exploits that party affiliation games admit an exact
potential whose relative gap (called stretch) between any two Nash equilibria is
bounded by 2. The latter property is not satisfied in our games, even for graph
coordination games (as the example outlined in the Introduction shows).
A class of games that is closely related to our graph coordination games are
additively separable hedonic games [8]. As in our games, the players are embedded
in a weighted graph. Every player chooses a coalition and receives as payoff
the total weight of all edges to neighbors in the same coalition. These games
were originally studied in a cooperative game theory setting. More recently,
researchers also address computational issues of these games (see, e.g., [4]). It is
important to note that in hedonic games every player can choose every coalition,
while in our graph coordination games players may only have limited options.
Anshelevich and Sekar [1] study coordination games with individual prefer-
ences where the players are nodes in a graph and profit from neighbors choosing
the same color. However, in their setting the edge weight between two neighbors
can be distributed asymmetrically and all players are assumed to have the same
3 In [9] the bimatrix games on the edges may have negative payoffs and this is exploited
in the PLS-completeness proof. However, we can accommodate this in our model by
adding a sufficiently large constant to each payoff.
strategy set. Among other results, they give an algorithm to compute a (2, n)-
equilibrium and show how to efficiently compute an approximate equilibrium
that is not too far from the optimal social welfare.
Concerning the social welfare optimization problem, a 2-approximation algo-
rithm is given in [12] for the special case of polymatrix coordination games with
individual preferences where the bimatrix game of each edge has positive entries
only on the diagonal.
Our techniques. Most of our existence results use a generalized potential function
argument for coalitional deviations. In our proof of the upper bound on the
inefficiency of (α, k)-equilibria we first argue locally for a fixed coalition of players
and then use a sandwich bound in combination with a counting argument to
derive the upper bound. Most of our lower bounds and hardness results follow by
exploiting specific properties and deep structural insights of graph coordination
games with edge weights.
It is worth mentioning that our algorithm to compute a strong equilibrium for
graph coordination games on trees reveals a surprising connection to a sequential-
move version of the game. In particular, we show that if we fix an arbitrary root
of the tree and consider the induced sequential-move game then every subgame
perfect equilibrium corresponds to a strong equilibrium of the original game. As a
consequence, strong equilibria exist and can be computed efficiently. Further, this
in combination with our strong price of anarchy bound shows that the sequential
price of anarchy [14] for these induced games is at most 2, which is a significant
improvement over the unbounded price of anarchy for the strategic-form version
of the game. This result is of independent interest.
We also note that the k/n bound on the social welfare which is guaranteed
by our strategy imposition algorithm is proven via a smoothness argument [16].
Besides some other consequences, this implies that our bound also holds for more
permissive solution concepts such as correlated and coarse correlated equilibria
(see [16] for more details).
2 Preliminaries
Let G = (G, (Si)i∈N , (qi)i∈N , (qij){i,j}∈E) be a polymatrix coordination game
with individual preferences (w.i.p.) where G = (N,E) is the underlying graph.
Recall that we identify the player set N with {1, . . . , n}. We first introduce some
standard game-theoretic concepts.
We call a subset K := {i1, . . . , ik} ⊆ N of players a coalition of size k. We
define the set of joint strategies of players in K as SK := Si1 × · · · × Sik and
use S := SN to refer to the set of joint strategies of all players. Given a joint
strategy s ∈ S, we use sK to refer to (si1 , . . . , sik) and s−K to refer to (si)i/∈K .
By slightly abusing notation, we also write (sK , s−K) instead of s. If there is a
strategy x such that si = x for every player i ∈ K, we also write s = (xK , s−K).
Given a joint strategy s and a coalition K, we say that s′ = (s′K , s−K) is a
deviation of coalition K from s if s′i 6= si for every player i ∈ K; we also denote
this by s→K s′. If we constrain to deviations of coalitions of size at most k, we
call such deviations k-deviations. We call a deviation α-improving if every player
in the coalition improves his payoff by at least a factor of α ≥ 1, i.e., for every
i ∈ K, pi(s′) > αpi(s); we also call such deviations (α, k)-improving. We omit
the explicit mentioning of the parameters if α = 1 or k = 1. A joint strategy
s is an α-approximate k-equilibrium (also called (α, k)-equilibrium for short) if
there is no (α, k)-improving deviation from s. If k = 1 or k = n then we also
refer to the respective equilibrium notion as α-approximate Nash equilibrium
and α-approximate strong equilibrium [3].
We say that a finite strategic game has the finite (α, k)-improvement property
(or (α, k)-FIP for short) if every sequence of (α, k)-improving deviations is finite.
This notion generalizes the finite improvement property introduced by Monderer
[15] for α = k = 1. A function Φ : S → R is called an (α, k)-generalized potential
if for every joint strategy s, for every (α, k)-improving deviation s′ := (s′K , s−K)
from s it holds that Φ(s′) > Φ(s). It is not hard to see that if a finite game
admits an (α, k)-generalized potential then it has the (α, k)-FIP.
The social welfare of a joint strategy s is defined as SW(s) :=
∑
i∈N pi(s).
For K ⊆ N , we define SWK(s) :=
∑
i∈K pi(s). A joint strategy s
∗ of maximum
social welfare is called a social optimum. Given a finite game that has an (α, k)-
equilibrium, its (α, k)-price of anarchy (POA) is the ratio SW(s∗)/SW(s), where
s∗ is a social optimum and s is an (α, k)-equilibrium of smallest social welfare. In
the case of division by zero, we interpret the outcome as ∞. Note that if α′ ≥ α
and k′ ≤ k, then every (α, k)-equilibrium is an (α′, k′)-equilibrium. Hence the
(α, k)-PoA lower bounds the (α′, k′)-PoA.
Due to lack of space, several proofs or parts thereof are omitted from this
extended abstract and will be given in the full version of the paper.
3 Existence
We first give a characterization of the values α and k for which our polymatrix
coordination games with individual preferences have the (α, k)-FIP.
Theorem 1. Let G be a polymatrix coordination game w.i.p. Then:
1. G has the (α, 1)-FIP for every α.
2. G has the (α, k)-FIP for every α ≥ 2 and for every k.
Proof. Observe that every α-improving deviation is also α′-improving for α ≥ α′.
It is thus sufficient to prove the claims above for α = 1 and α = 2, respectively.
The proof idea for the first claim is to show that the game admits an exact
potential and thus has the FIP.
We prove the second claim for α = 2 by showing that Φ(s) := SW(s) is a
(2, k)-generalized potential. Given a joint strategy s and two sets K,K ′ ⊆ N ,
define
Qs(K,K
′) :=
∑
i∈K, j∈Ni∩K′
qij(s) and Qs(K) :=
∑
i∈K
qi(s).
Consider a (2, k)-improving deviation s′ = (s′K , s−K) from s. Let K¯ be the
complement of K. We have SWK(s) = Qs(K,K) + Qs(K, K¯) + Qs(K). Note
that SWK(s
′) > 2SWK(s) because the deviation is 2-improving. Thus,
Qs′(K,K) +Qs′(K, K¯) +Qs′(K) > 2
(
Qs(K,K) +Qs(K, K¯) +Qs(K)
)
. (2)
The social welfare of s can be written as
SW(s) = Qs(K,K) + 2Qs(K, K¯) +Qs(K¯, K¯) +Qs(K) +Qs(K¯).
Note that Qs(K¯, K¯) = Qs′(K¯, K¯) and Qs(K¯) = Qs′(K¯). Using (2), we obtain
Φ(s′)− Φ(s) = Qs′(K,K) + 2Qs′(K, K¯) +Qs′(K)
−Qs(K,K)− 2Qs(K, K¯)−Qs(K)
> Qs(K,K) +Qs′(K, K¯) +Qs(K) ≥ 0.
Thus Φ(s) is a (2, k)-generalized potential which concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
The next theorem shows that in general our polymatrix coordination games
do not have the (α, k)-FIP for α < 2.
Theorem 2. For all α < 2 there is a polymatrix coordination game G that has
a cycle of (α, n− 1)-improving deviations.
We derive some more refined insights for the special case of graph coordina-
tion games.
Theorem 3. The following holds for graph coordination games:
1. Let G be a graph coordination game on a tree. Then G has a strong equilib-
rium.
2. There is a graph coordination game G on a graph with one cycle such that no
(α, k)-equilibrium exists for every α < ϕ and k ≥ 2, where ϕ := 1
2
(1+
√
5) ≈
1.62 is the golden ratio.
Note that Theorem 3 shows that for k ≥ 2 a k-equilibrium may not exist.
In contrast, Nash equilibria always exist by Theorem 1. Further, the graph used
to show the second claim is a pseudoforest4. For graph coordination games with
unit edge weights, this guarantees the existence of a strong equilibrium [2].
4 Inefficiency
We analyze the price of anarchy of our polymatrix coordination games. The
upper bound in the special case of (α, k) = (1, n) follows from a result in [5].
Theorem 4. The (α, k)-price of anarchy in polymatrix coordination games
w.i.p. is between 2α(n− 1)/(k − 1) + 1 − 2α and 2α(n− 1)/(k − 1). The upper
bound of 2α is tight for α-approximate strong equilibria.
4 A graph is a pseudoforest if each of its connected components has at most one cycle.
Proof (upper bound). Let s be an (α, k)-equilibrium (which we assume to exist)
and let s∗ be a social optimum. Fix an arbitrary coalition K = {i1, . . . , ik} of
size k. Then there is a player i ∈ K such that pi(s∗K , s−K) ≤ αpi(s). Denote by
pKi (s
∗) := qi(s∗) +
∑
j∈Ni∩K
qij(s∗) the total payoff that i gets from players in
K under s∗ (including himself). Because all payoffs are non-negative, we have
pKi (s
∗) ≤ qi(s∗i ) +
∑
j∈Ni∩K
qij(s∗i , s
∗
j ) +
∑
j∈Ni∩K¯
qij(s∗i , sj) = pi(s
∗
K , s−K). (3)
Thus, pKi (s
∗) ≤ αpi(s). Rename the nodes in K such that ik = i and repeat the
arguments above with K \ {ik} instead of K. Continuing this way, we obtain
that for every player ix ∈ K, x ∈ {1, . . . , k}, p{i1,...,ix}ix (s∗) ≤ αpix(s).
We thus have
∑
i∈K
(
qi(s∗) +
1
2
∑
j∈Ni∩K
qij(s∗)
)
=
k∑
x=1
(
qix(s∗) +
∑
iy∈Nix∩K: y<x
qixiy (s∗)
)
=
k∑
x=1
p
{i1,...,ix}
ix
(s∗) ≤ α
∑
i∈K
pi(s).
Summing over all coalitions K of size k, we obtain∑
K:|K|=k
(∑
i∈K
(
qi(s∗) +
1
2
∑
j∈Ni∩K
qij(s∗)
))
≤ α
∑
K:|K|=k
∑
i∈K
pi(s). (4)
Consider the right-hand side of (4). Note that every player i ∈ N occurs
in
(
n−1
k−1
)
many coalitions of size k because we can choose k − 1 out of n − 1
remaining players to form a coalition of size k containing i. Thus
∑
K:|K|=k
∑
i∈K
pi(s) =
(
n− 1
k − 1
)∑
i∈N
pi(s) =
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
SW(s). (5)
Similarly, the first term of the left-hand side of (4) yields
∑
K:|K|=k
∑
i∈K
qi(s∗) =
(
n− 1
k − 1
)∑
i∈N
qi(s∗) ≥ 1
2
(
n− 2
k − 2
)∑
i∈N
qi(s∗).
Now, consider the second term of the left-hand side of (4). Every pair (i, j)
with i ∈ N and j ∈ Ni occurs in
(
n−2
k−2
)
many coalitions of size k because we
can choose k− 2 out of n− 2 remaining players to complete a coalition of size k
containing both i and j. Thus for the left-hand side of (4) we obtain
∑
K:|K|=k
(∑
i∈K
(
qi(s∗) +
1
2
∑
j∈Ni∩K
qij(s∗)
))
≥ 1
2
(
n− 2
k − 2
)(∑
i∈N
qi(s∗) +
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Ni
qij(s∗)
)
=
1
2
(
n− 2
k − 2
)
SW(s∗). (6)
Combining (5) and (6) with inequality (4), we obtain that the (α, k)-price of
anarchy is at most 2α
(
n−1
k−1
)
/
(
n−2
k−2
)
= 2αn−1k−1 . ⊓⊔
5 Complexity
In this section, we study the complexity of various computational problems on
graph coordination games.
Theorem 5. Let G be a graph coordination game. Given a joint strategy s, the
problem of deciding whether s is an (α, k)-equilibrium
1. is in P , if k = O(1) or k = n;
2. is co-NP-complete for every fixed α.
Proof (sketch). We sketch the proof of the first claim for k = n. A crucial insight
is that if there is an α-improving deviation from s then there is one which is
simple, i.e., s′ = (s′K , s−K) where the subgraph G[K] induced by K is connected
and all nodes in K deviate to the same color s′K = x for some x.
Fix some color x and let Gx := (Nx, Ex) be the subgraph of G induced by the
set of nodes Nx that can choose color x but do not do so in s. For each u ∈ Nx
define du := αpu(s) − w({{u, v} ∈ E | sv = x}) − qu(x). Now, a deviation of
a coalition K ⊆ Nx to (xK , s−K) is α-improving if and only if for every node
u ∈ K the total weight of all incident edges in the induced subgraph Gx[K] is
larger than du. We prove that an inclusionwise maximal K ⊆ Nx satisfying this
property can be found in polynomial time. This way we can verify for every color
x whether an α-improving deviation exists. ⊓⊔
Deciding whether a graph coordination game admits a k-equilibrium is hard
for every k ≥ 2. Note that for unit edge weights 2-equilibria are guaranteed to
exist and can be found efficiently, as shown in [2].
Theorem 6. Let G be a graph coordination game. Then the problem of deciding
whether there is a k-equilibrium is NP-complete for every fixed k ≥ 2.
Proof (k = 2). We give a reduction from minimum maximal matching which
is known to be NP-complete [17]: Given a graph G = (V,E) and a number l,
does there exist an inclusionwise maximal matching of size at most l?
Let (G, l) be an instance of this problem with G = (V,E) and n = |V |. We
add n − 2l gadgets H1, . . . , Hn−2l to G, where an illustration of gadget Hi is
given in Figure 1. The dashed edge from vi0 to G indicates that v
i
0 is connected
to all vertices in G and each of these edges has weight 3. We assign to each node
v ∈ V the color set Sv = {xiv | i = 1, . . . , n− 2l} ∪ {ye | e = {v, w} ∈ E}, i.e., v
can either choose a ‘gadget color’ xiv or a color corresponding to some adjacent
edge in E. Every edge in E has weight 4. Note that for all joint strategies of
nodes in V the set of unicolor edges in E constitutes a matching. The idea is
that in every 2-equilibrium n−2l nodes in V are needed to ‘stabilize’ the gadgets
and the 2l remaining nodes in V form a maximal matching.
Assume that G has a maximal matching M ⊆ E with |M | ≤ l. We construct
a 2-equilibrium s. For every matched node v ∈ V (M), choose the color corre-
sponding to the adjacent matching edge. On the unmatched nodes in V and
nodes of the form vi0, we assign colors in such a way that every gadget has one
Gvi0{a, c} ∪ {x
i
v | v ∈ V }
vi1
{a, b}
vi2
{b, c}
ui
{b}
Hi
3
4 3
2
3
Fig. 1. The gadget Hi.
outgoing edge (indicated by the dashed edge) that is unicolor. This is possible
because there are at least n− 2l unmatched nodes in V . If there are uncolored
nodes in V left, assign arbitrary colors to them. Finally, let vi1 and v
i
2 choose
color b for every i. We claim that s is a 2-equilibrium: The matched nodes ob-
tain a payoff of 4, which is the maximal payoff nodes in V can get; so they are
not part of any improving deviation. Let v ∈ V be unmatched. Then v cannot
deviate together with another unmatched node to increase the payoff because
M is maximal. Further, all gadget nodes are ‘taken’: every vi0 has a payoff of 3,
which a joint deviation with v cannot increase. This implies that v cannot be
part of any improving deviation. Lastly, it is easy to see that pairs of gadget
nodes cannot profitably deviate. This proves that s is a 2-equilibrium.
Conversely, assume that a joint strategy s is a 2-equilibrium. LetM consist of
the unicolor edges in G. By the choice of the color assignment,M is a matching.
M is maximal because if there were two unmatched adjacent nodes, then they
could form a profitable deviating coalition. It remains to show that |M | ≤ l. It is
not hard to see that if there is a gadget without an outgoing unicolor edge, then
there is a 2-improving deviation in Hi. So at least n − 2l nodes choose gadget
colors, implying that |V (M)| ≤ 2l and thus |M | ≤ l. ⊓⊔
On the positive side, we can compute a strong equilibrium in polynomial
time if the underlying graph is a tree.
Theorem 7. Let G be a graph coordination game on a tree. Then there is a
polynomial-time algorithm to compute a strong equilibrium.
Proof (sketch). The idea is as follows: We fix an arbitrary root r of the tree and
consider the induced sequential-move game. This game has a subgame perfect
equilibrium s which can be computed in polynomial time by backwards induc-
tion. Let s¯ be the corresponding joint strategy of G if every player plays his best
response according to s. We can prove that s¯ is a strong equilibrium of G. ⊓⊔
6 Coordination mechanisms
In this section, we investigate means that a central designer could use to reduce
the inefficiency of Nash equilibria.
In our games the common payoff qij of the bimatrix game on edge {i, j} ∈ E
is distributed equally to both i and j. An idea that arises is to use different
payoff sharing rules to reduce the inefficiency. Unfortunately, it is not hard to
see from the example given in the Introduction that the price of anarchy remains
unbounded no matter which payoff sharing rule is used.
We therefore consider another natural approach. Suppose the central designer
can impose strategies on a subset of the players to reduce the inefficiency. Let G
be a polymatrix coordination game w.i.p. Further, let K ⊆ N be a subset of the
players and fix a joint strategy fK ∈ SK for players in K. We define G[fK ] as
the game with players from N \K that arises from G if we fix the strategies of
all players in K according to fK . We say that fK guarantees social welfare z if
SW(fK , s−K) ≥ z for all Nash equilibria s−K of G[fK ]. We also call fK a joint
strategy of size |K|.
Suppose that fK guarantees social welfare z. Then once all players in G[fK ]
have reached a Nash equilibrium we can release all players in K and let them
play their best responses too. By Theorem 1, the social welfare can only increase
subsequently. As a result, the final Nash equilibrium has social welfare at least
z. So we can view fK as a ‘temporary advice’ for the players in K. A similar
idea has been put forward in [6].
We first show that determining the minimum number of players to guarantee
a certain social welfare is hard, even for graph coordination games.
Theorem 8. Let G be a graph coordination game. Given a joint strategy s, the
problem of finding a minimal k such that there is a joint strategy fK of size k
that guarantees social welfare SW(s) is NP-hard. The claim also holds if fK is
restricted to be sK .
In light of the above hardness results, we resort to approximation algorithms.
Theorem 9. Let G be a polymatrix coordination game w.i.p. Given a joint strat-
egy s and a number k, we can find in polynomial time a coalition K of size k
such that sK guarantees social welfare
k
nSW(s) and this is tight.
Using the 2-approximation algorithm in [12] for the social welfare optimiza-
tion problem, we obtain the following result:
Corollary 1. Let G be a polymatrix coordination game w.i.p. where the bimatrix
game of every edge has positive entries on the diagonal only. Given a number
k, we can compute a joint strategy fK of size K that guarantees social welfare
k
2nSW (s
∗), where s∗ is a social optimum.
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